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CUSTODY OF CHILDREN IN MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS:
THE LAWYER'S FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY
CHARLES ROTHENBERG*

Infant children whose custody is in dispute in matrimonial controversies
are wards of the court. The lawyers representing the contending parties
are officers of the court. Hence, counsel share with the court a responsibility towards the children which is equal to their obligations to their respective clients. These obligations are measured precisely by their responsibility
to the children, for the reason that the parents can have no greater rights
than those of the children.
The lawyer representing the father or mother of a child whose custody
is in dispute can only discharge his duty to the extent that he serves the
child's best interests. The child's benefit is the parent's gain; the child's
detriment is the parent's loss. Parents are benefited when their children
are properly fed, clothed, housed; when they have the advantages of good
schooling, spiritual guidance, vacation and play; when they are happy and
free of emotional and psychological conflicts. The lawyer discharges his
duty to the client who has paid him and entrusted him with the advocacy
of his cause wheni he strives to bring about these high objectives. Counsel
for both sides are therefore in the truest sense the child's advocates.
This is an important consideration for lawyers to bear in mind when
they come into court to press or oppose claims for custody. Too often
they misconceive their true function. They act on the assumption that
their clients have rights which in some vague and undefined way are independent of and to be distinguished from the rights of the child. To be
sure, they invariably acknowledge the supremacy of the child's rights, but
fall into the error of identifying them with the client's rights, when it should
be the other way around. This is an error unfortunately which is often
attributable to the courts as well. A Missouri court states:
In awarding the care and custody of the infant child, the court
is concerned primarily with the welfare of the child; but the rights
of the parents may not be altogether disregarded.
A Wyoming court puts it as follows:
The controlling question in awarding custody of children is
their welfare, but rights of2 parents must be considered if not conflicting with such welfare.
And a Florida court goes even further and suggests that the parents'
rights are paramount to those of the child:
The welfare of the child must, of course, be regarded as the
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1. Des Roche v. Des Roche, 287 S.W. 786 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Mo., 1926),
2. Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 248 Pac. 1 (1926).
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chief consideration ...but the inherent rights of parents to enjoy

the society and association of their offspring, with reasonable
opportunity to impress upon them a father's or a mother's love and
affection in their upbringing, must be regarded as being of an
equally important, if not controlling consideration in adjusting the
right of custody as between parents in ordinary cases.3
This attitude finds support in our very statutes. In every jurisdiction
there is legislation which in one form or another establishes the right to
the custody of children. This is something which is taken more or less for
granted. Yet, it runs counter to the universal policy of making the child's
welfare the chief if not the exclusive issue in determining custody.
Properly speaking, and in the very strictest sense of the word, the client
has no rights in the matter-only the child has rights. For example, we
are all familiar with the universally accepted principle that where children
of tender years are concerned, the mother is the preferred custodian. At
Comnon Law (and, in varying degree, in somc five states today), the father
had the priority. It must be apparent that both ideas are predicated upon
a fundamental fallacy. If either parent has a paramount claim to administer
the child's guardianship, it is not merely because he or she is more competent to do it-i.e., that it would be in the child's best interests for him or
her to do it-but that the parent's own true interest in the matter must
be protected and secured. But the question presents itself-what rights or
interests of the parent are at stake? If any such rights or interests exist, it
is only because the child's welfare creates them. The first stem from the
other. That is why we find more and more of our courts making the
child's welfare the only issue. The Maryland court holds that this matter
of the child's welfare must be the "sole consideration; ' 4 the New York"
and Texas" courts call it the "controlling consideration;" even the Missouri
court, which was quoted earlier, now seems to take a different position. In
two recent decisions it declared that the child's welfare is the "sole objective"7 and the "only end to be sought.""
A very good and concise statement on the subject came from an Oklahoma court which held that in custody disputes, it must be guided by "the
best interests of the child in respect to temporal, mental and moral welfare,
and should consider the influence and protection afforded by parental
affection, if such be manifest." This puts the parents' "rights" in correct
perspective. Parents are entitled to enjoy the society of their children only
in the measure that they have earned it-and this, in turn, comes about not
by force of their regard or solicitude for the children, but by the degree in
which it has been demonstrated.
If these latter statements arc more truly representative of the correct
3.
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Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (1933) (emphasis supplied).
Swoycr v. Swoyer, 157 Md. 18, 149 Af. 190, 195 (1929).
See People ex relWay v. Williams, 101 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (1950).
Fannett v. Tompkins, 49 S.V.2d 896 (rex. Gt. of Civil App. 1932).
See Glass v. Class, 37 S.W. 2d 467 (St. Louis Ct. of App., Mo., 1931).
Abel v. Ingram, 223 Mo. App. 1087, 24 S.W.2d 1048 (1930).
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policy which the courts should adopt in determining the question of custody, then it follows that the procedure as it currently operates in the
courts of our land, runs counter to that policy. As a single example of
such inconsistency, a matrimonial decree usually provides that custody of
the child is awarded to one or another of the contestants, most often a
parent, whereas it should provide that it is the child who is allowed the
right to be with one or the other. It is the child, in other words, who
should be the beneficiary of the judgment-it is he who should be awarded
guardianship by his father or mother.
There is more involved here than a matter ot emphasis. It is not a
question of fomulation but of principle. The lawyer who seeks to serve
his client's cause does not accomplish his purpose by merely stressing the
child's interest. It is not enough that he elaborate this aspect of the matter: he must espouse it. Thus, it is a basic error to dwell on the harm which
may befall the child if his client is denied custody, or the benefits which
will accrue to the child if his client is granted custody, so long as these considerations are in any sense identified with the client's rights.
An understanding of all this is necessary to guide counsel in the correct
representation of his cause. If he is the advocate of the child, then it means
that he must assume that role and do so both in avowal and deed. Someone must speak up for the child: the contestants themselves are usually too
subjective to be of any help: and since the child is generally too young to
do it himself, the lawyer does it for him. The fact that his opponent purports to act in the same capacity, raises no contradiction: on the contrary,
it represents a collaboration between them insofar as they pursue the same
objective, with the sole difference that they disagree as to the best means
of achieving it. This, in turn, means that counsel must be free to exercise
his independent understanding and untrammeled judgment as to the correct
position which he should take. It behooves him to make the decisions,
chart the course which is to be followed and determine the means by
which it should be done.
Let counsel by their uncompromising devotion and adherence to the
child's cause, serve notice not only to their clients but to the community
as a whole that they recognize the real import of custody, that it creates
obligations not prerogatives, and that it is not a privilege but a trust. In
that way they will be true to the tradition of service which distinguishes
their high calling and at the same time make themselves incomparably more
effective in achieving a successful result.

